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Introduction 
From United Front to Popular Front: The CPC in 1936 
John Manley 
As WITH PARTS I AND n of The Depression Years series, the present volume, 
covering 1936, is almost entirely taken up by the RCMP's assiduous scrutiny 
of the Communist Party of Canada (CFC). RCMP informants and analysts 
identified "The Party" as the only serious threat to capitalist hegemony; by 
comparison. Trotskyism is almost completely absent from the following 
pages. There is a certain irony here, in that with the full adoption of the Popular 
Front in 1936 the CPC seemed to be enthusiastically embracing social demo-
cratic reformism. The RCMP, however, refused to be fooled: anticipating the 
verdict of a later generation of anti-communist historians, they interpreted the 
Popular Front line as an elaborate ruse, designed to gull respectable but 
soft-heaited liberals and socialists into unconscious sponsorship of the com-
munists' unchanged revolutionary objective. 
This introduction will consider the character of the Popular Front, if only 
to test the implicit verdict of the R.C.M.P. Security Bulletins (henceforth 
Bulletins). Historians are divided in their interpretations of this moment in the 
history of the Communist International (Comintern). Eric Hobsbawm, reflect-
ing the impact of 197J}s Eurocommunism, has found a "usuable past" in the 
Popular Front "strategy." He characterizes the post-Seventh Comintern Con-
gress line as a strategy "of concentric circles. The united forces of labour (the 
'United Front') would form the foundation of a wider electoral and political 
alliance with democrats and liberals (the 'Popular Front')." He rejects the view 
that the deliberate shift from "an insurrectionary to a gradualist, from a 
confrontational to a negotiating, even a parliamentary, way to power" involved 
Irving Howe and Lewis Coser, 77K American Communist Party, A Critical History 
1919-1957 (New Yoik 1962). 
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a betrayal of socialism. Other historians, however, sharing the views of those 
Hobsbawm labels "purists on the ultra-Left," have argued that the attempt to 
keep the two "concentric circles" connected led not to the progressive domi-
nation of the proletarian inner-circle but to a capitulation to Liberalism. The 
verdict of Cold War scholarship has already been mentioned. 
Without wishing to be judged a mugwump, I would argue that all three 
perspectives are too essentialist to capture the lived experience of the Popular 
Front. They almost certainly impute an exaggerated degree of forethought to 
the Comintern. The Seventh Congress line had, after all, emerged from a 
troubled gestation and its application contained improvisation as well as 
planning. Though there was a clear shift away from the policy of ft°ontal 
attack, most communists continued to believe that insurrection was their 
ultimate goal. Many of the elements that comprise a Gramscian "war of 
position" perspective became visible in 1936: the pursuit of alliances, the 
struggle for cultural hegemony in civil society, the political education of 
proletarian "organic intellectuals," the need to win over bourgeois organic 
intellectuals to the working class. Whether their presence constituted a 
fully-articulated strategy — reformist or revolutionary — is another matter. 
Viewed without hindsight, the Popular Front of 1936 was not the finished 
article of 1938. All the CPC really knew was that the general direction of the 
new wind from Moscow was to the right. When Stewart Smith announced to 
a Lenin Memorial Meeting in Edmonton that the Seventh Congress line would 
be applied by every CP without exception (placing the humble CPC on a par 
with the mass parties of France and Spain), it is doubtful if even he, the most 
Êric Hobsbawm. Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991 (London 
1994), 147-8, 162-3. 
See, for example, James Weinstein, Ambiguous Legacy: The Left in American Politics 
2;Jew York 1975). chs. 3, 5. 
rcmando Claudin, The Communist Movement: From Comintern to Cominform (Har-
mondsworth 1975), 166-99; E.H. Cair. The Twilight of Comintern, 1930-1935 (Bas-
ingstoke 1982). 147-55. 
'For examples of the various ways in which party leaders explained the new line, see 
Stewart Smith. Vancouver RCMP Security Bulletin (henceforth Bulletin) #792, 5 
February 1936; Jan Lakeman, Edmonton: #803, 22 April 1936; Sam Carr, Winnipeg 
#788, 8 January 1936. 
though, of course, they were not conceptualized as such; the Italian theoretician's 
travails in fascist prisons were intermittently highlighted in Comintern circles, espe-
cially when the general political line of the movement shifted towards Gramsci's 
longstanding criticisms of the Third Period, but his proto-Popular Frontism was not 
common intellectual currency. See Maria Montagnana to Togliatti, 29 April 1937, 
Appendix 12, in Paolo Spriano, Antonio Gramsci and the Party: The Prison Years 
(London 1979), 181-2. 
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Moscow-sensitive of the CPC leadership, knew precisely where the line would 
lead by die year's end. 
My primary intention here is a UKxlest one: to use die Bulletins to iUustrate 
some of the key themes of CPC politics in 1936. Readers will quickly realize 
that I barely mention many others: the ritual of support fw the Soviet Union, 
the role of {»otestant clergymen in the politics of peace and anti-fascism, the 
party's wooing of the CCF and Social Credit, the election of Canada's first 
communist provincial legislatOT (James Litterick), the emergence of solidarity 
with Republican Spain as a cause célèbre, the continued vibrancy of the 
unemployed movement, to mention just some (they might also note that while 
the RCMP clearly had excellent contacts inside the party, it either chose not 
to reveal the full extent of its knowledge here ot failed to penetrate the inner 
con of the party leadership). I have concentrated on three themes that elucidate 
the growth of the Popular Front and point up issues of intrinsic interest to 
historians of the party and the period. The first two concern the way in which 
a section of the party leadership translated an "anti-sectarian" thrust into a 
"liquidationist" tendency that seemed to threaten every part of the party 
apparatus save the party itself. By way of contrast, the third, a brief examina-
tion of the party's attempt to build a national youth movement, hints at the 
positive potential of the Popular Front to extend the sphere of politics more 
widely and deeply into civil society than any previous party initiative. 
Against 'Sectarianism' 
THE AMOUNT OFTIME party leaders had to spend at the start of 1936 reassuring 
the rank and file that the CPC had not abandoned revolutionary goals suggests 
that a considerable number of ordinary members feared the opposite. Most 
rank and filers recognized the value of unity with the Cooperative Common-
wealth Federation (CCF) and its Cooperative Commonwealth Youth Move-
ment (CCYM); indeed at the local level joint action was already common. 
Many were prepared to work with the growing number of middle class 
sympathizers —including many protestant ministers—who were being drawn 
into struggle by the Canadian League Against War and Fascism (CLAWF) 
and the rapidly changing unemployed movement Few, however, readily 
perceived the socialist potential of an alliance with Social Credit and some in 
''BulUtin #792,5 February 1936. 
On the participation of ministers in left wing activities, see Bulletin #788, 8 January 
1936 (Montreal, Glace Bay); #790.22 January 1936 (Toronto); #792,5 Febniary 1936 
(Edmonton); #794,19 February 1936 (Alberta); #796,4 March 1936 (Kenora, Ont.); 
#797, 11 March 1936 (Edmonton); #801. 8 April 1936 (Winnipeg): #802, IS AprU 
1936 (Vancouver); #805.6 May 1936 (Toronto). 
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a packed party audience at thé Grand Theatre, Calgary, must have been aghast 
when they heard Stewart Smith declare that "its aims were similar to that of 
die Communist Party, i.e., to raise the standard of living in Alberta." In January 
the party refused to endorse the pamphlet Hitlerism in Canada, written by 
Vancouver sympathizer A.M. Stephen and published by the B.C. provincial 
(x^anization of the CLAWF, on the grounds that it had labelled Social Credit 
and {Movincial premier William Abeihart "fascist and anti-semitic." Since this 
had been the standard party line on Social Credit only months earlier, some 
members may have wondered what fresh concessions would be required to 
create the People's Party. 
The appeasement of the "outer circle," moreover, was quickly backed up 
by an internal attack on the residue of Third Period sectarianism. Since 
ideological "purges" had become an established part of party life in the late 
1920s, the leadership had usually been careful to call for equal vigilance 
against "right" and "left" dangers. During 1936, however, believing they had 
Comintern approval, they pursued the liquidation of sectarianism with such 
vigour that a general "liquidatory" tendency took hold. Their main target was 
the apparatus of "fronts" that had traditionally operated as "transmission belts" 
between the party and the class. As we shall see below, the first and most 
significant victim was the Workers' Unity League, but the Canadian Labour 
Defense League (CLDL/> and even the Young Communist League (YCL) 
became vulnerable too. 
The CLDL's case is particularly instructive, not only for exemplifying the 
party's general rightward tendency but also for revealing the lack of clarity 
surrounding the new line and the disputes — understandable but hitherto 
undocumented — that were occurring within the party leadership over its 
implementation. Early in 1936 the party received a lengthy directive from the 
International Red Aid (the CLDL's parent body) on the "Reorganization of 
the Canadian Labour Defense League and the Building of a People's Defense 
Movement." This called for the CLDL to work for the construction of a more 
broadly-based defence organization reflecting the "progressive awakening 
^Bulletin #790,22 January 1936; #791,30 January 1936. Perhaps stung by Tim Buck's 
charge that it had gone overboard in offering Aberhart unconditional approval, the 
{Hovincial party quite quickly moved to a united front "from below" approach to the 
Social Credit rank and file. This was probably an example of the party centre emulating 
in its relations with the periphery its own relations with the Comintern; mistakes always 
lay in the implementation of policy on the ground. See #804,29 April 1936 and #818, 
5 August 1936. For Buck's rebuke, see Ivan Avakumovic, The Communist Party in 
Canada: A History (Toronto 1975), 108-11. 




ammig masses of middle class, church and professional people" to die emof-
ing fiucist daagex. While honouring the CLi)L's ' ^ h history ot struggle and 
adiievement," the document charged that its "«ganization and kaderehip** 
were seriously marred by "hidebound sectarianism." To eliminate its over-
close identification with the party, ttie Inteniati(»al Red Aid ordered it to 
throw off "'old' Party fonas and ideology," learn a discourse that reflected die 
"needs and thoughts of the Canadian people," and work in a way that would 
{Move "palatable to all strata." 
The Comintern's reference to the "hidebound sectarianism" of die CLDL's 
leadership could only have meant National Secretary A.E. Smith. Was it 
purely coincidental that, shortly after this message arrived, the veteran party 
leader should leave for a European trip that kept him out of Canada until 
October? Questions like these reveal the limitations of the Security Bulletinr, 
RCMP analysts often seem lacking in fundamental historical curiosity! Smith 
probably accepted the case for a broader organization, but he was surely not 
prepared for what happened in his absence. Sailing from New Yoric on 14 
March, he may not have attended the CPC National Executive Committee 
meeting three weeks earlier, which decided to strengthen the organization 
before "liquidating [it] at the earliest possible moment" and transforming it 
from a national organization into local Citizens' Defence Committees. He 
was not at the 7 March meeting in Montréal when Becky Buhay Ewan referred 
to the CLDL as a "second CF' and reported that the Comintern had wdered 
the liquidation of the International Red Aid itself. Liquidation was the 
message that reached the lower party units. Some quickly launched new 
organizations mon attuned to the Popular Front thrust; Winnipeg's CLDL 
branch, for example, became the more bourgeois-fticndly Citizen's Liberty 
Qub. Often, however, CLDL branches simply fell into decline, to UM 
detriment of woricers' defence. 
When Smith returned from Europe in October, he immediately stopped die 
liquidationist movement in its tracks. News of the International Red Aid's 
death had clearly been exaggerated. Smith had brought home another of its 
"ßtt/fc/tfi #794,19 February 1936. 
'^A.E. Smith, All My Life: An Autobiography (Toronto 1977), 171-91. Smith makes 
no mention of the Comintern directive, nor does Jaroslav Petryshyn, "'Class Conflicts 
and Civil Liberties': The Origins and Activities of the Canadian Labour Defense 
League, 1925-1940," Labour/Le Travailleur (L/LT), 10 (AuUmin 1982). 39-63. 
^^Bulletin #796,4 March 1936. 
^*BulUtin #798.18 March 1936. 
^'Bulletin #801. 8 April 1936. 
nlie campaign in support of Ontario unemployed activists arrested during a rash of 
militant relief strikes in the spring and summer was unusually weak. See Bulletin #814. 
8 July 1936; #816.29 July 1936; #826.30 September 1936. 
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directives, again strongly critical of the CPC but this time on the grounds that 
the Canadians had exceeded their anti-sectarian remit Since the CLDL had 
abandoned sectarianism, the party's decisicm to liquidate it was "totally 
untenable." Instead, it deserved the fullest support. Becky Buhay Ewan, now 
representing the British Columbia CPC District Committee (where, it is worth 
noting, the CLDL was never allowed to die), revealed her ability to swim with 
die tide by submitting to party headquarters a resolution recommending inter 
alia that "we endorse the proposed tour of A.E. Smith across Canada during 
which he will undertake to assist in every way possible the rebuilding pro-
gramme of the CLDL." As events transpired, however, the CLDL never 
regained the importance it held in the early 1930s. 
Deeper archival research is needed to discover precisely what was going 
on here. The apparent alacrity of some leaders and ordinary members to wind 
up an important part of the party apparatus raises important questions. Were 
they, as the documents suggest, simply misreading the Comintern's signals? 
Or, given that the party certainly did read "liquidate" where the instructions 
said "reorganize," were other — possibly informal — conununications en-
couraging them to read between the lines? Or were they positively seizing the 
chance to liberate themselves definitively from the "sectarian isolation" of the 
Third Period, never doubting the need for a vanguard party to coordinate their 
efforts but increasingly confident in their ability to swim otherwise unaided 
in the mainstream of the labour movement? 
Some members, of course, including some leading members, were less than 
wholeheartedly committed to the Popular Front. It is no surprise to find the 
British Columbia CLDL resisting the liquidationist tendency or to see leading 
Vancouver cadre Malcolm Bruce emerging from the Bulletins as a "residual" 
sectarian element. When other sections were dismantling themselves, the B.C. 
CLDL was conducting an intensive six-week training school "principally 
dealing with [the] conduct of individuals under arrest for picketing or other 
activities such as street demonstrations, delegations, etc." Bruce, meanwhile, 
had been identified by the party centre as a loose cannon. Before a "peace 
rally" in Vancouver, at which he was the keynote speaker, he received a 
directive to be "very careful in [his] utterances and not openly antagonize 
anyone." Whether he complied is not known, but we next encounter him 
treating open-air crowds at Cambie Street grounds to his views on the German 
Social Democrats' responsibility for preparing Hitler's rise to power. Al-
though some of the comrades at the centre may well have privately agreed 
with Bruce's extra{>olation that the CCF was bent on following a similar path 
of misleadership, they found it politically embarrassing to hear this view 




expounded continuously and in public. It needs to be stressed, however, dut 
there weie very few Xlalctdm BnioesrThis is underlined by the lack of open 
defiance to the centre's trade union policy. 
The End of the Workers' Unity League and the Rise of Workers' Unity 
As NOTED IN THE INTRODUCTK»! to die preceding volume in this series, unlike 
its counterpart in the United States, the Workers* Unity League (WUL) 
remained an active trade union force throughout 193S. Although its "liqui-
dation" was ordered by the November CPC Central Committee Plenum and 
the immediately-following WUL National Convention, the WUL did not 
simply "dissolve" overnight. The present volume shows in considerable 
detail that liquidatic» was a process — indeed party officials often preferred 
to use the more positive term "unity i»ocess*' — that took several months to 
complete. Once the decision was talœn, as Irving Abella justiy observes, "there 
could be no exceptions." The party undoubtedly followed what Canadian 
Trotskyists gleefully described as a "Unity at Any Cost" policy. Yet while 
the WUL simply withdrew support from some snudl local unions, where the 
larger red unions were concerned it maintained at least the appearance of 
rank-and-file democracy. The party's determination to play a "responsible" 
^*BulUtin »796,4 March 1936; #804,29 AprU; #808,27 May; #812, 24 June 1936. 
On Brace's leftism, see Manley, "Communism and the Canadian Woridng Class in the 
Great Depression: The Woricers' Unity League. 1930-1936." PhD disseitatioa. Dal-
housie University, 1984,132, S43-4.In the 1940s Bruce joined the Canadian Trotskyist 
movement In an interview with the author, the late Reg Bullock claimed that Bruce 
broke emotionally with Stalinism during the Popular Front 
"john Manley, "Introduction" to Gregoiy S. Kealey and Reg Whitaker, eds., R.C.M.P. 
Security Bulletins: The Depression Years, Part II, 1935 (St John's 1995), 12-4. 
Gorman Penner and Irving AbcUa give this impression in, respectively. The Cana-
dian Left: A Critical Analysis (Scaiborough 1977), 138, and Communism, Nationalism, 
and Canadian Labour (Toronto 1973), 3-4. 
^^The Vanguard, 16 September, 15 November 1935. TrotskyisU considered that the 
party's "turn" had vindicated their longstanding opposition to the party's withdrawal 
fix>m the international unions. For its part the CPC tried to dinerentiate between its 
unity policy and the "right-opportunist liquidation which is sponsored by the counter-
revolutionary fragments of Trotskyism in Canada." Sec "The WUL Fights for Unity," 
in Towards a Canadian People's Front, Proceedings of the Ninth Plenum of the Central 
Committee, CPC (Toronto, November 1935), 122-26. On the WUL generally, see John 
Manley, "Canadian Communists, Revolutionary Unionism, and the ^Third Period': 
The Workers' Unity League, 1929-1936." Journal of the Canadian Historical Asso-
ciation, NS, 5 (1994), 167-94.1 spend little time on the unity process in that article and 
am grateful for the opportunity to say a little more here. 
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leading role in the unified unions meant that, if only for reas<Mis of self-interest, 
it had to hold the red unions together while negotiating the best possible terms 
of readmissi(Mi to the American Federaticm of Labor ( AI^). 
The Bulletins contain several useful documents on the CPC's trade union 
unity ideology and tactics. One in particular, a long repott on The CP and the 
Trade Unions," includes an outline of proposed trade union work in Southern 
Ontario that shows how the CPC leadership quickly accepted the general 
Comintern strategy of working for "one trade union in each industry; for one 
federation of trade unions in each country; for one international federation of 
trade unions organized according to industries; and for one international of 
trade unions based on the 'class struggle.'" It also shows that the party 
imderstood the need to explain retrospectively a tactic which summarily 
overturned five years of struggle and left many WUL members, as one 
ex-communist put it, "dazed and gasping for breath." Having been taught that 
the "reformists were the worse enemies of the working class, out of a clear 
blue sky came the ... announcement that these men ... were okay. They were 
fine, upstanding defenders of labor's right... progressive, trustworthy fighters 
for denmcracy. We were ordered to throw all our convictions overboard, to 
turn our backs on the cause to which we had willingly given our life." 
With the decision taken at the top, and with no real discussion of why the 
Third Period line was wrong, the party launched a "wide propaganda cam-
paign" to explain the importance of trade union unity to the members of both 
the WUL and AFL unions. Party speakers, armed with speakers' notes (a 
(»oduct of the contemporary emphasis on internal party education) on the 
defensive and offensive advantages of workers' unity, dwelt on the real 
possibilities that now existed to "organize the unorganized" in the "basic" 
industries. They constantly hammered home this message at mass meetings 
and open forums, often with the participation of more intelligent AFL repre-
sentatives who knew that once the party had determined to assist the interna-
tional unions its members would apply themselves to the task with unsparing 
diligence. Communists did not shirk the question of "trade union democ-
racy," but they meant by this the fight to reinstate comrades who had been 
expelled in previous years and to oppose any "unprincipled splitting" of 
All-Canadian Congress of Labour (ACCL) unions. Their greatest concern was 
to give practical proof to the AFL of their bona fides. All ne wly formed unions 
were to be affiliated to the AFL, and whenever possible red unions should be 
transferred to it without undue prevarication over the "procuring of charters." 
Most instructively of all, the party abandoned its "rank and fileist" tradition. 
'Ex-Communist,' "I was a Communist Agitator," Labor Leader, 18 December 1936. 
^See Hyman Langer, "How Toronto Dressmakers Rejoined ILGWU," Justice, 15 
August 1936. 
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Instead of organizing permanent "Oi^xnition Groups," comnwmist» were 
instructed to organize on an <k/ hoc basis around the issues thrown up by the 
labour movement The objective was not to have ctmtiol of permanent fii^ioos 
but to draw "large nund>ers of workers who will help us cany dirou^ 
progressive policies and refnms in each union." 
Local circumstances dictated the tempo of liquidation/unity. In Winnipeg, 
for example, negotiations for "the gradual liquidation of all W.Ui^ unions in 
the City" were well advanced by January, largely as a consequence of a 
dramatic incursion by International Ladies' Garment Wwkers' Union (IL-
GWU) organizer Sam Hetbst during the previous sununer. By the autumn oi 
1935 Herbst had engineered the negotiated entry of the Industrial Unicm of 
Needle Trades Workers' (lUNTW) into the ILGWU.^ With the departure of 
the WUL's biggest local unit, it was merely a question of ushering smaller 
groups of railroad workers, truckers, bakers, meat packers, and furriers into 
the appropriate craft or Trades and Labour Congress (TLC)-chartered federal 
labour union. The pace of unity in Montréal was equally swift. Devastated 
by the defeat of the 1934 lUNTW dressmakers' strike, during the spring of 
1935 the party effectively abandoned its attempt to keep the union going. 
Veteran party member Alex Gauld, who had never surrendered his meniber-
ship in the AFL Plumbers' Union or become truly reconciled to the Third 
Period line, emerged as the most prominent organizer of trade union work, 
which by the spring of 1936 was wholly devoted to organizing the unorgan-
ized, notably in steel, metal woridng, and longshoring, into the AFL. 
The idea that trade union tmity was always imposed without formal 
consultation can be dispelled by looking at developments in any of the more 
established ted unions. Here we will look at the entry of the Lumber Workers' 
Industrial Union into the Lumber and Sawmill Workers' Unioit, a semi-
autonomous section of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners 
(UBCJ), but there were similar developments in, for example, the garment 
trades and coal mining. 
^SB #791.30 January 1936; #818,5 August 1936. 
^The Vanguard, 15 July, 1 August, 2 September, 15 October, 1,15 November 1935; 
Manitoba Commonwealth, 19, 26 July, 16, 23 August 1935; Toronto, Multicultural 
History Society of Ontario. ILGWU Records, Sam Kraisman to Sam Herbst, 20 July 
1935; Herbst to Kraisman. 19 August 1935; Winnipeg Free Press, 30 August 1935; 
Young Worker, 7 September 1935; Justice, 1 September 1935. 
^SB, #788,8 January 1936; #789,15 January 1936. 
^National Archives of Canada, R.B. Bennett Papers, microfilm, 94348, RCMP, 
weekly memorandum re "Revolutionary Activities in Quebec." 26 March 1935; SB 
#801, 8 AprU 1936. 
^ o r the lUNTW, see Manley. "Communism and the Canadian Working Class," 
514-21; and for the Nova Scotia miners, see Michael J. Earle, "The Coalminers and 
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The process began with the union's Western District Wage Scale Confer-
ence held in Vancouver in late December 1935. The presence of fraternal 
delegates from the Vancouver UBCJ and Washington state locals of the 
LSWU underlined that the CPC was already actively promoting unity. Jack 
Stevenson, a prominent UBCJ leftist emphasized the advantages of unity with 
die AFL, citing the example of the 193S longshore strike as a reminder of the 
dangers of isolation from the mainstream. LSWU delegates pointed out the 
unfavourable disparity in wage levels between Canada and the United States 
and called for the LWIU to unite in struggle for wage equalizaticm. The 
conference duly voted to recommend unifîcation with the LSWU as a step 
towards a stronger union and higher wages. During January and February the 
LWIU executive negotiated merger terms that could not have been bettered. 
The British Columbia LWIU became the B.C. district of the LSWU, with its 
existing — CP-led — locals intact and with full rights of representation on the 
Vancouver Trades and Labour Council. It put this proposal to a district 
referendum in April, and with the LSWU already supporting an LWIU strike 
at Cowichan Lake, there was never any doubt that unification would go 
through. Members voted by 1048-23 to accept the deal. 
These events had obvious implications for the LWIU's Eastern District 
Indeed, while unity negotiations between the LSWU and LWIU started later 
in the east, they were completed even earlier. Interestingly, the union's Ontario 
leaders initiated unity talks with the Port Arthur Trades and Labour Council 
(PATLC) as early as September 1935. At that time they took the position that 
the Council should rally behind the red union, since it was the only independent 
labour organization in the Ontario and Québec lumber industry. They aî >ar-
ently held that position until early March, but the speed of subsequent events 
suggest that other negotiations were going on behind the scenes. When the 
LWIU called on delegates from the LSWU, UBCJ and International Pulp and 
Sulphite Workers Union to attend its Eastern District Conference at the Port 
Arthur Trades and Labour Hall on 21-22 March, it clearly intended to catch 
up with developments on the coast. In fact, it surpassed them. The conference 
doubled as a unity celebration, with delegates voting unanimously to enter the 
LSWU.^ 
Their 'Red' Union: The Amalgamated Mine Workers of Nova Scotia, 1932-1936," 
L/LT, 22 (Fall 1988). 130-3. and David Frank and John Manley, "The Sad March to 
the Right' J.B. McLachlan's Resignation from the Communist Party of Canada. 1936." 
ULT, 30 (FaU 1992), 115-34. 
^Bulletin #789,15 January 1936; #793.12 February 1936; #803,22 April 1936. 
^BuIUtin #798.18 March 1936; #800.1 April 1936. For developments in 1935. see 
Manley. "Communism and the Canadian Working Class." 339. 
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During die eariy monAs of 1936, then, the Wmkers' Unity League (WUL) 
was dismantled as htst as decency allowed. On many occasions J.B. Salsbeig 
and Tom Ewan negotiated satisfactory terms of mager or readmission, but 
when the internationals proved recalcitrant they usually pressed for "organ-
izational cmnprcMnises." By no means every WUL member agreed that unity 
required the WUL's demise. At a meeting of over 1.000 TorcMito workers in 
the Strand Theatre on 12 January. Salsberg acknowledged that "certain indi-
viduals ... are reluctant" to go back to the "reactionaiy" unions. But go back 
they did. In May a political bureau circular on the campaign against sectari-
anism specifically castigated the "leftist" course of the Nova Scotia membos 
in the campaign to re-unite the red Amalgamated Mine Woricers with District 
26 of John L. Lewis' United Mine Woricers of America. Showing a fine grasp 
of dialectics, it simultaneously charged the Nova Scotians with failing to 
appnciaie the significance of Lewis' stand as the champim of industrial 
unionism and accused them of thereby weakening rather than strengthening 
"the fight against Lewis."^^ This circular may have been the last straw for 
veteran Cape Breton communist J.B. McLachJan, whose growing alienation 
stemmed in large part firom the party's unconditional surrender to the Ameri-
can miners' leader. Significantly, McLachlan was the only prominent party 
member to resign over the WUL's liquidation. 
During the Third Period the connections between trade unionism and 
political class struggle were always clear. Now. however, the final conflict— 
though still on its way! — seemed far less imminent What now was the 
purpose of industrial work? Communist spokespersons had alternative an-
swers for different audiences. When they shared the platform with AFL 
notables, they en^ihasized harmony, responsibility, sincerity, unity fw unity's 
sake. Speaking alone before party audiences, on the other hand, the watchword 
was struggle. In ̂ neral, however, the party leadership was happy to settle in 
for the long haul. Tom Ewan's appointment as B.C. provincial trade union 
chief in July was significant. His commitment to the new line was not in 
question, but it was perhaps more politic to install as national trade union 
director J.B. Salsberg, who was both a former reformist union bureaucrat (in 
^^ Bulletin #790,22 January 1936. 
^^Bulletin #807,20 May 1936. 
^̂ See Bulletin #825, 23 September 1936 for a report on Willie Gallacher's speech at 
Glace Bay and J.B. McLachlan's emotional intervention in which he declared his 
willingness to "die for the CF' and "was heartily applauded by a large number of the 
people present" See also, Frank and Manley, "The Sad March to the Right," 129. 
Compare reports of meetings in Toronto and Edmonton. Bulletin #790, 22 January 
and #808,27 May 1936. See also, Manley, "Communism and the Canadian Working 
Qass," 350-3. 
^'Bulletin #815,15 July 1936. 
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the Hat, Cap and Millin«7 Woricers' Union) and a casualty of Third Period 
'^dtra-leftism." Once the return of the WUL into the internationals had been 
successfully negotiated, Salsberg turned to the tricky task of consolidating a 
left wing bloc at the forthcoming TLC Annual Convention while cementing 
an alliance with the labour establishment. 
Under Salsberg's direction, the party did not abandon its leading role in 
building new trade union organization. Throughout most of 1936 conununists 
continued to build on the WUL's pioneering achievements, sometimes in 
subdued, semi-clandestine fashion but often through strikes, several of which 
attracted close attention from the Security Bulletins (notably those involving 
B.C. loggers, sugar beet workers in Alberta and Ontario, Wiimipeg furriers, 
and rayon textile workers in Cornwall, Ontario). For a clear understanding of 
the dynamics of these strikes, the Security Bulletins have to be supple-
mented. In terms of the development of the Popular Front, however, there 
are hints here that party leaders were adopting a similar stance towards 
industrial militancy to that of their French counterparts — admittedly in more 
momentous circumstances — that same summer, when proof of revolutionary 
maturity was said to be knowing when and how to stop a strike rather than 
press it forward towards a premature "political" conclusion. 
An intriguing report of an internal party discussion on the conduct of the 
Cornwall strike reveals, on the one hand, criticism of the strike leadership's 
early lack of militancy and on the other hand a marked hesitancy among the 
party leadership in deciding on militant solidarity action. One member pro-
posed spreading the strike to textile plants in Weiland, Toronto, and Hamilton 
—but only if negotiations at Cornwall failed. He also recommended picketing 
the Scarboro depot of the Toronto Transportation Company, which Cour-
tauld's employed to ship the fmished rayon. Another contributor felt that it 
would be too difficult to isolate the Cornwall-bound trucks from those plying 
between Montréal and Toronto and suggested that the strike committee in 
Cornwall should roll rocks down on the trucks as they left for the highway! 
Neither action was endorsed. Instead, agreeing that defeat seemed likely, the 
On the Alberta beet strikes — and for a critique of Popular Front industrial tactics 
— see John Herd Thompson and Allen Seager, "Workers, Growers and Monopolists: 
The 'Labour Problem' in the Alberta Beet Sugar Industry Ehiring the 1930s." L/LT, 3 
( 1978), 164-71. On the logging strikes, see Myrtle Bcrgren, Tough Timber: the loggers 
of British Columbia — their story (Toronto 1977), 90-6. See the September Bulletins 
for the Winnipeg fur strike. 
Julian Jackson, The Popular Front in France (Cambridge 1988); Claudin, The 
Communist Movement, 199-207. 
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party decided to send a representative 'lo assist the leadership so diey may 
know bow far to retreat 
This measured, even pessimistic, approach may have stemmed solely from 
a desire to terminate the strike on die best possible terms. One other Cactor, 
however, may have impinged on the party's reasoning. In July die CPC 
National Trade Uni(» Commission had published its program for submission 
to the TLC, calling for a return to the principles of the prc-Third Period 1920s: 
industrial unionism, trade union unity, and Canadian trade union autonomy. 
W\äi the TLC Annual Convention in Montréal fast q)proaching, the party may 
have considered that its short term interests would best be served by a 
deck-clearing exercise elsewhere. A lingering strike in a nearby town, involv-
ing mainly non-craft-skilled young women, was an unnecessarily messy 
context fcMT an intervention that was designed in part to denxMistrate the left's 
new sense of maturity. 
The left's passive demeanour at the convention suggested that the party had 
subordinated militancy to unity. Among the various proposals left wingers 
[»essed through their unions and trades councils in advance of the convention 
was one calling for the creation of a TLC "organization department" to 
coordinate the activities of the growing number of directly chartered federal 
local unions and initiate the formation of new federal locals in the auto, rubber, 
textiles, steel, meat packing and leather indusbies; in other words, the indus-
tries in which the WUL had established no more than the bare beginnings of 
organization. Histoiy eerily repeated itself; as in the eariy 1920s, not one 
left wing resolution was carried. The only real difference lay in the left's 
response. Given its analysis of the moment as one pngnant with organizing 
possibilities, one might have expected its members to greet TLC inertia with 
the sort of withering rhetoric that was de rigeur a decade earlier. But as the 
RCMP repotted, the left was 'Yather inconspicuous.' Not reported in the 
Security Bulletins was the one occasion when debate on the floor threatened 
to get out of hand: on the call for mandatory retirement of TLC officials at age 
60 or 65. Emerging fix)m the shadows, Salsberg chastised this attack on 
labour's "official family" and specifically cited veteran President Paddy 
Draper as a man whose experience was invaluable to the movement 
^Bulletin #822,2 September 1936. On the Cornwall strike, see Daily Clarion, 4,6,7, 
11, 12 August 1936 and Bernard Rawlinson. "Cornwall: Diaiy of a Strike," New 
Frontier, 1 (October 1926), 15-7.23. 
^BulUtin #821.26 August 1936. 
''ibid. 
'^Bulletin #825.23 September 1936. 
For an account of the Convention, see Manley. "Communism and the Canadian 
Working Class." 375-8. 
14 THE DEPRESSION YEARS, PART ffl 
The failure of the left-wing bloc to press the issue of industrial unionism 
meant that it barely reached the convention floor. Behind the convention's 
bland official proceedings an unofficial "corridcw congress" had been in 
constant session, in which the question of industrial unionism had been 
virtually the sole subject of hectic "discussion, lobbying and caucusing." In 
retrospect, Salsberg admitted that the party had probably underplayed its hand. 
However, he also managed to console himself with the thought that, once the 
party had translated "the CIO methods of organization [into] Canadian terms," 
aie irrefutable logic of industrial unionism as the only possible mode of 
organizing the mass production industries would have to be recognized. If 
Salsberg's caution was tactically defensible, some on the left may have 
wondered whether and under what circumstances he would end his deference 
to the "official family."*^ 
That said, there is little doubt that the trade union unity process vastly 
enhanced the party's trade union influence. The many warnings in the Security 
Bulletins to this effect were not simply the product of paranoia. When 
compared with the position in 1928-29, when the CPC bolted from the 
mainstream, its influence in 1936 was incomparably greater. In passing, it is 
worth raising the question: would the CPC have been in an even stronger 
position if it had spent the Class against Class years embedded in the interna-
tional unions or was its vitality in 1936 a consequence of the credit accumu-
lated during the years of sectarian independence? 
In any event, the Bulletins reported one communist success after another. 
The year began with Jan Lakeman, one of those expelled in 1929, defeating 
the conservative President of the Edmonton Trades and Labour Council 
(ETLC), Carl Berg, in the contest to become Council delegate to the AÏberta 
Federation of Labor. Although the ETLC proceeded to invoke the AFL's 
anti-communist clause and narrowly overturn the vote, both the CPC and the 
RCMP felt that the industrial future in Alberta belonged to the left. Prospects 
looked equally favourable in Montréal. In 193S Alex Gauld had boasted that 
the shop paper produced for the Angus CPR shops, the Headlight, had a 
circulation of 500; in April 1936 an unidentified speaker reported diat 2000 
copies of the paper were now being distributed. Although a later account 
revealed that victimizations had left party members in the railroad shops 
"afraid to carry on any work," it also noted that the CPC now had 21 delegates 
on Montréal Trades and Labour Council, including every delegate from the 
*^.B. Salsberg, "Lessons for Labour from the TLC Congress." Daily Clarion, 26 
September 1936; Salsberg, "Where Our Trade Congress Fell Short," Daily Clarion, 3 
October 1936. 
**BuUetin #790,22 January 1936; #820,19 August 1936. 
^'Bulletin #807,13 May 1936; #801. 8 April 1936. 
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Amalgamated Clodiing Woricers' Union. The Mcmtréal party now had an 
Industrial OMnmission to cooidinate trade union work and was entrenched ia 
11 trades. Similariy qptimistic reports emanated fiom Winnipeg and Vm-
couver. 
The RCMP was probably most coocemed with the left's dramatic trade 
uni(» advances in Ton»to. The Bulletins report die "swing to die left" in die 
Toronto Trades and Labour Council (TTLQ in May, when die TTLC voted 
almost unanimously both to rescind its 1929 anti-communist clause and to 
endorse industrial unicniism; by August more than SO communists were 
delegates to the TTLC. Unlike the 1920s, moreover, trades and labour council 
activity was not a substitute for shopfloor organization. The Toronto party's 
Industrial Commission was typically unsatisfîed with the progress of "concen-
tration wotk" — fw all its growing influence, the party's longstanding 
inability to organize itself on a "bolshevized" woriqilace basis remained 
worrisome—but there were promising signs of new industrial life in the shop 
papers appearing at General Steel Wares and Massey Harris. Political and 
trade union advances made the party "dizzy with success," as witnessed by its 
mock funeral for Section 98 of the Criminal Code at Queen's Park, whne a 
euphoric Tim Buck pledged that the CPC would recruit 100,000 new members 
for the AFL by die 1937 party congress.^ 
In genera], the RCMP reported in August, Canadian trade unionism was 
undergoing a "profound radicalization" largely due to the re-admission of 
former red unionists. The Bulletins noted with dismay the a{q)earance of die 
Daily Clarion in May, its special "steel issue" in November, when 4000 extra 
copies were produced for distribution throughout Canada's steel centres, and 
the surprising degree of trade union fînancial support the communist daily was 
receiving. Commenting on the paper's end-of-year press drive, it noted diat 
where support in the past had come almost exclusively from the party's 
language organizations, in this drive the union locals and trades and labour 
councils listed as donors were "too numerous to mention." Not only the source 
but the amount of money raised was remarkable, given that the Clarion drive 
was run in tandem with another (equally effective) fund-raising campaign in 
support of Republican Spain. The last issue of the 1936 Bulletins noted 
*^Bulletin #823,9 September 1936. 
*''BulUtin «808,27 May 1936; Vancouver; #812,24 June 1936; #821.16 August 1936; 
#832,12 November 1936; Wmnipeg. 
*^BulUtin #809, 3 June 1936; #814. 8 July 1936; #823, 9 September 1936; #816, 29 
July 1936. 
*^Bulletm #819,12 August 1936. 
'^Bulletin #834.23 November 1936; #835.2 December 1936. 
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another unwelcome development: Canada's first sit-down strike, at Kelsey-
Haycs Wheel, Winds«-.'' 
A Hegemonic Project? Children and "The Youth" 
As PETER HUNTER'S important memoir demonstrates, the CPC made an early 
turn away from the Third Period in its work among "the youth." Not yet a YCL 
member. Hunter was chosen to attend the inaugural Paris Wwld Youth 
Congress gainst War and Fascism in 1933. On his subsequent national 
publicity tour, he discovered that certain "bourgeois tendencies" had crept into 
party culture. Arriving in Winnipeg in rather bedraggled shape, he was 
suriMised to be asked to wear a "presentable" (borrowed) suit before appearing 
at a banquet in his honour. The YCL was already active in the wider youth 
community, and in Winnipeg he addressed several meetings of high school 
students, university students, and the general public, to which the Winnipeg 
Free Press gave sympathetic coverage. 
Thus when Bill Kashtan addressed the Seventh Comintern Congress on 
behalf of the Canadian YCL he was able to report that the Canadian organi-
zation was already well on the way towards transforming itself "from a narrow 
organization into a broad mass non-Party organization, standing at the head 
of wide sections and strata of youth." Its members now understood the 
importance of relating to young Canadians "as they are and not as we would 
like them to be," and Kashtan looked forward to the creation of a mass youth 
organization with 25,000 individual members. The YCL had already be-
come the prime mover behind the Canadian Youth Congress (CYC). First held 
in May 1935, when it was re-launched on a permanent basik in 1936 commu-
nists were thoroughly acclimatized to pursuing through it work of a progres-
sive rather than strictly socialist character. The YCL ended 1936 predicting 
the imminent decline of the Cooperative Commonwealth Youth Movement 
(CCYM), one of the strongest forces in the CYC, because of its refusal to 
abandon "narrow socialist" perspectives. 
RCMP reports on city, provincial and national conferences on peace, 
anti-fascism, "socialism and economic reconstruction" and the material needs 
of young Canadians show how conununists struggled to create a national mass 
youth movement of high school and university students, young professionals, 
^^BulUtin #837,23 December 1936. 
'̂ Pctcr Hunter, Which Side Are You On Boys? Canadian Life on the Left (Toronto 
1988).38-42,46-7. 
Sections of the speech are quoted in Bulletin #811,17 June 1836; my emphasis. 
^Bulletin #835,2 December 1936. On the CYC and 1930s student protest, see Paul 
Axeliod, "Spying on the Young in Depression and War Students. Youth Groups and 
the RCMP. 1935-1942," Labour/U Travail, 35 (Spring 1995), 43-63. 
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and rural and urban young workers. Inevitably, diey reflect die security 
services' one-sided interpretation of communist motives. As YCL leaders 
woe aware, the feeling was widesf^ead that their work among young people 
and children was "a sn«e for unsuspecting innocents. State officials saw 
Ute left's promotion of progressive rather than socialist issues as merely 
tactical; one RCMP analyst quoted the French Communist Marcel Cachin's 
comment that in pursuit of dieir goals communists were prepared to "ally 
ourselves with the devil" and commuted that "The devil, in this instance, 
apparently means the bourgeois youth of Canada. Communists made die 
counter-argument that their subordination of long term political goals to the 
daily struggle around the "immediate needs of the youth" simply reflected the 
level of consciousness of non-paity youth; they added that they never hid their 
socialist propose — an assertion that also spoke to the non-party left's claim 
that the party really had betrayed socialism. 
One change in communist youth politics during the Popular Front saw a 
new practical distinction made between "children" and "youth." Fourteen had 
always been the age of eligibility fat membership of the YCL. Younger "reds" 
could join the Young Pioneers, but both organizations had traditicMially been 
activist extensions of the party itself, their members coming almost entirely 
from party families. Dissatisfaction with the Young Pioneers* exclusivity and 
lack of impact came to the fore in 1935-36, when the party launched an attempt 
to create a new organization, the Children's Council. As its name suggests, 
the emphasis of this organization was to be supervisory rather than participa-
tory. One party document, reprinted here, virtually wrote off the Young 
Pioneers. Without once mentioning the organization, the document admitted 
that its methods had been inappropriate, not least because "parents [were not] 
willing to have their children act as shock troops of economic struggle." Thus, 
in the Popular Front, parents rather than their children were to be the key 
activists. The party intended to give them practical guidance on how to 
struggle on behalf of their children's educational, health, recreational, and 
housing needs. Meanwhile, the children themselves could be children rather 
than young bolsheviks. Another sign of changing times was the party's 
willingness to consider as potential allies groups once considered militarist 
auxiliaries of the imperialist state — cadres were even enjoined to learn from 
the "methods and forms of work" of the Boy Scouts! 
The party's strategic objective was to exercise indirect but progressively 
deepening political influence on young people. It hoped to build a broad 
"Bulletin #831.4 November 1936. 
'^Bulletin #811.17 June 1936. 
See the report of the tour and speech of "Miss Turn" of the Twonto Children's 
Council in Bulletin #796,4 March 1936. 
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"progressive" federation of children's «ganizations and aimed to root it in 
existing non-party labour and left wing organizations (CCF, trough unions, 
socialist parties), its own associated "progressive" organizations like the 
CLAWF, "Women's peace" organizations and "established" bourgeois youth 
and community organizations like the Scouts, Girl Guides, Y.M.C.A.S and 
Settlement Houses. By the middle of the year the party could point to several 
successful initiatives in the Toronto-Hamilton area: f(Mr example, an arts and 
crafts exhibit and "Peace Poster Campaign" organized by the Canadian Youth 
Council in T(»x>nto, the organization of children's sections by two Toronto 
CCF Clubs and a particularly impressive effort in Hamilton, where fîve groups 
had been "Set up by the CCF organization ... thru the indirect work of the 
Hamilton's Children's Council." 
The party considered the Hamilton project especially promising for having 
drawn in sympathetic artists and boys' camp leaders, for notwithstanding its 
new emphasis on indirect influence, the party retained a strong belief in the 
crucial importance of party-building. During the Popular Front, the CPC for 
the first time gave serious attention to the recruitment of middle class intellec-
tuals. As well as winning over working class parents, the new orientation was 
designed to win over teachers, social workers and Settlement House workers 
to the progressive children's movement. The party considered that many 
members of these professions working in daily contact with the working class, 
teachers in particular, were ready to align themselves with the labour move-
ment Moreover, "progressive" teachers and social workers were "a fine 
source from which to draw cadres — already trained to a certain extent—for 
the children's movement." With this in mind, perhaps, the Toronto Children's 
Council (TCC) organized a two-week summer training school for young 
progressives (CCF left-wingers were specially invited) who were planning 
careers in work with children. In theoretical and practical classes they could 
study such subjects as Child Psychology, the History of Education, Child 
Welfare, and Teachers' Problems.̂ * 
It is interesting to observe RCMP responses to the party's evident success 
in winning over middle-class converts: "Under the cloak of respectability 
[they manage] to attract persons who ordinarily would never think of associ-
ating themselves with the open Communist movement. The membership is 
constantly growing." The reference here was specifically to the New Theatre 
Group of Montréal, but the analysis was typical. Setting aside the possibility 
that young middle-class people might be genuinely inspired by belonging to 
a cause, the "deluded dupes" approach overlooked another possibility: that the 
"respectable" had their own ulterior motives and were quite consciously using 
'^Bulletin #818,5 August 1936. 
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the petty to advance diem.^ Like the TCC with its training school, dte New 
Tbrâtie Ofoup (25 per cent of its 140 members were communists) offered 
aspiring young cultural workers in its various dance, drama, and writers' 
groiq» opportunities to learn and experiment, and petfaqM obtain dteir first 
footholds on the professional IxKider. 
CHaims and counter-claims about communist naotives cannot be defini-
tively evaluated here, but the "deluded dupes'* inter|xetation is firankly patron-
izing to some of the country's brightest young people. Mmeover, the RCMP's 
tunnel-vision produced erms of fact as well as interpretation. When a meeting 
of the Ontario Section of the CCYM passed a resolution on war, the RCMP 
ascribed its impeccably Leninist "revolutionary defeatist" politics (turn impe-
rialist war into civil war by means of a general strike) to the ptesaace of three 
YCL fraternal delegates: it is much man likely that at diis moment the YCL 
would have supprated the minority who voted against the resolution. The 
RCMP accurately reported the YCL's criticism of the "narrow socialist 
polities" of the Ontario CCYM's leadership, then added that the YCL believed 
that the CCYM was stagnating because it had expelled YCLers and Trotsky-
ists. The latter, of course, formed one of the few groups with whom the YCL 
was not prepared to ally. All of this is to state the obvious, that these documents 
should be handled with care. 
The RCMP was certainly correct in one important respect; the party's 
success among high school and student youth was in part a consequence of 
superior organization. As ever, communists were ready to do the donkey work 
and eager to generalize good and bad practice from acciunulated experience. 
A report from a communist students' conference in Montréal, attended by 
delegates from McGill, Toronto, Queen's, Dalhousie, and two Montréal high 
schools, shows how the YCL was tackling the task of building a "front of the 
young generation." Particularly interesting is the description of work in the 
high schools. Although it insisted that there could be "no stereotyped formula," 
it offered die following rough guidelines based on work at three Montréal 
schools, Baron Byng, Commercial, and Strathcona: 
When one or two contacts exist in a school they should be talked to with a 
view to organizing a club — as a rule they will be on the progressive side. 
eg 
Bulletin #835,2 December 1936. On the idealism of middle-class young commumsts, 
see Joan Sangster, Dreams of Equality: Women on the Canadian Left, 1920-1950 
(Toronto 1989), 152-3. 
^ o f a brief discussion of left wing theatre in the Popular Front period, see Robin 
Endres, "Introduction" to Richard Wright and Robin Endres, eds.. Eight Men Speak 
and other plays from the Canadian workers' theatre (Toronto 1976), xxxiii-v. 
^^BulUtin #795,26 Fcbniaiy 1936. 
^Bulletin #835,2 December 1936. 
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The exact situation in the school must be found out from them, so that it 
becomes clear what type of club and activity are best suited. After three or 
four failures they get together between half a dozen and a dozen of their 
friends. After persuading these that the club must be neither a collection of 
inteUectual giants nw ostensibly be interested in nothing but ping-pong 
while in reality acting as a snare for unsuspecting innocents, the club is 
xmdet way. In two OT three weeks, with constant prodding, its membership 
will be over IS, and then it is high time to organize circles and activities. 
The ideal model was Strathcona High, where a handful of contacts was 
translated into a 60-strong "progressive" club with a YCL core of IS. 
We see once again emphasis on recruiting the "most active and developed 
people" to the party and YCL. Among university and high school contacts 
activity was the more prized quality. Opening its doors to "all those interested 
in working for a new social order," the YCL provided new recruits with regular 
training in Marxist theory. Half of its meetings were pure "educationals" and 
SO per cent of the time at other meetings was also devoted to some form of 
educational activity. This approach, it was thought, would sidestep the routine 
that haunted party life: "Dry as dust meetings are even more dangerous in the 
high school YCL than elsewhere." High school YCL cadres were not burdened 
with general responsibilities, but were encouraged to take a full and active part 
in the recreational activities of their schools. Reminding cadres that "socials 
and parties are an essential part of high school work," the YCL urged then to 
become "regular" citizens of the school community. 
The YCL operated in a similarly flexible and realistic manner on university 
campuses. Communists believed that the popularity of the League for Social 
Reconstruction (LSR) and the McGill Social Problems Club (MSPC) indi-
cated that a considerable section of the undergraduate population had deep 
interests in studying and thinking about social issues. The YCL's task was to 
find the right organizational forms to tap into this idealism. Impressed by the 
MSPC model, the YCL (which predictably had a fraction inside the McGill 
group) wanted to organize at each university a new dues-paying body that 
would be recognized as "the most alive and sensitive group of progressive 
students on campus," capable of attracting the support of outstanding profes-
^Bulletin #831,4 November 1936. 
^Ibid. Sec also Bulletin #804, 29 April 1936 for a report on the YCL in Québec. Of 
300 delegates at the Montreal Youth Congress, the vast majority were anglt̂ hones; 
only S of 135 groups represented were French Canada. Of the IS (of 300) YCL 
delegates, the only two named were David Kashtan and one "Cowley" — possibly 
Kent'Rowley, who joined the YCL at high school in 1934. See Rick Salutin, Kent 
Rowley: The Organizer: A Canadian Union Life (Toronto 1980), 9-15. 
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son, willing to look towards the labour movement and active in deed as well 
as dnughL Early in 1936 it attrmptrd to create a Student League (tf Canada 
(SLQ, only to ccMiclude some months later that such an organization could 
only be built from the bottom up. 
As they worked to create the SLC, communists also woiced to organize a 
YCL unit (Ml evoy college ctanpm. Only the YCL could provide "ctmsistent, 
collective guidance and leadership" to the new recruits who would be pulled 
to the left — like the several 'Religious" McGill students who had been 
convinced diat they could woric most effectively for "a new social order as 
members of the YCL." As in the high schools, it was not essential for these 
young men and women to have accepted "fully the programme of the Comin-
tern" since Marxist theoretical training would be provided. Indeed, YCL 
campus meetings were largely devoted to educational work. Typically two 
hours long, they ideally broke down into 20-30 minutes on current events, 45 
minutes on studept issues, and 45 minutes to an hour on Marxist theory. YCL 
students were encouraged even more strongly to immerse diemselves in 
marxist literature: self-study was the "most important and most obvious type 
of educational activity." The YCL was committed to showing the Canadian 
youth that "its full rights can only be granted by socialism," but it also urged 
communist students to **try to be students while they are in college. 
SupericM" organizational skills alone would not have established the YCL's 
place at the heart of the youth movement Communists also had the clearest 
vision of the issues that would mobilize Canadian youth. According to the 
RCMP, communists drafted the year's two most detailed statements of youth: 
the Declaration of Rights of the Canadian Youth and the Canadian Youth Bill 
(xcsented (by non-party groups) to the 1936 Canadian Youth Congress. 
Hiese documents were frankly reformist In line with the contemporary CPC 
tactic of rooting radical politics in national dennocratic traditions, they claimed 
political inspiration from the English 'Glorious Revolution' of 1688-89!; they 
appealed across class boundaries to all sections of the youth whose futures 
were threatened by monopoly capitalism (the young unemployed, exploited 
young woikers, intellectually excellent working class youth excluded fivm the 
later years of high school and the universities by their inability to pay, young 
fanners faced with the prospect of dispossession, aspiring professionals facing 
unemployment, native Canadian youth on demoralized reservations, creative 
artists); and they proposed a set of demands that sought to place the interests 
of youth at the heart of a social democratic welfare state and protect them by 
^Bulletin #797,11 March 1936; #831,4 November 1936. 
' ^ C L circular letter to All District Committees, 10 June 1936, in Bulletin #812, 24 
June 1936. 
*^See Bulletin #808,27 May 1936. 
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means of a permanent Canadian Youth Commission. Broader political con-
cerns wen confined to criticism of Canadian rearmament and the possibility 
of conscription; those who supported such policies wete the "enemies of 
youüi."* 
The Security Bulletins provide useful information on the Canadian Youth 
Congress (CYC) and the party's role within it Although numerical claims 
have to taken with a good pinch of salt, there is little doubt that consistent party 
— and non-party— activity among youth organizations since the inaugural 
1935 CYC was reflected in the numbers attending. There were 456 delegates 
compared to 300 in 1935, and they were said to represent more than double 
the numbers of young Canadians (from 162,705 to 343,666). More provinces 
were represented, but the vast bulk of delegates continued to come from 
Ontario (337) and Quebec (79). The only provinces without representation 
were Prince Edward Island and, more significantly, Alberta, where consumer 
resistance to left-wing student politics was quite marked. The YCL's will-
ingness to settie for indirect control was reflected in the size of its delegation; 
at 29 it was smaller that those of the United Church (42), the YMC A (37), and 
CCYM (30), though of course the YCLers may well have been present within 
other delegations. Labour representation was weak, with only eight delegates, 
and the size of the French Canadian delegation was not only small but, in the 
form of the Jeunesses Patriotes, disruptive. Peihaps to placate the ten Liberal 
and five Conservative delegates, YCLers made no mention of socialism in 
presenting their case for maximum unity behind the Declaration of Rights and 
the Youth Bill. They underlined their commitment to unity by offering Bill 
Kashtan's place as one of two CYC delegates to the forthcoming World Youth 
Congress to René McNicoll, a member of another French Canadian group, the 
Association Catholique de la Jeunesse Canadienne, who had fallen two votes 
short of Kashtan's second place (first went to the CCYM's Kenneth 
Woodsworth, nephew of the CCF national leader). 
How Communists mobilized around youth and student groups at the local 
level cannot be discovered here in any detail (the report on the October 
students' conference in Montréal is the best single source by far). We learn 
that the YCL national office sent out a circular to all district committees on 
10 June ordering unspecified propaganda and practical activity around the 
CYC Youth Bill and urging special attention to work in union locals and trades 
councils. Student groups were encouraged to make links with the organized 
working class, for example by joining picket lines, and it was clearly the 
«Tbc Canadian Youth Congress is reported in Bulletin #811,17 June 1936. 
^Ibid. 
'"'Bulletin #833,18 November 1936. 
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party's pnmipting that led to the creation of a CYC Industrial Committee with 
plans to mobilize inside a select group of unions — all with a substantial 
communist presence. The YCL also helped build YMCA and United Church 
youth groups by joining — or "inflltrating" — them.^ Was it this woric that 
led to an apparent breakthrough among black Canadian youth? A report in 
August stated that the YCL now had organizers and organized groups in the 
black communities of Montréal, Traonto, London, Windsor, and Chatham, 
enjoyed the sui^xxt of several black churches and was planning to organize a 
Canadian Negro Youth Association. Finally, a definitive study of commu-
nist youth policies would have to take up the Spanish question. The emergence 
of solidarity widi Republican Spain as a youth issue, reflected in a report of 
Bill Kashtan's q>eech at the Toronto Labour Fwum, coincided with quiet 
{»essure to convert the idealist pacifism of youth into practical intematicmal-
ism.̂ * 
Not the Conclusion 
¥KQitA THE PERSPECTIVE of 1936, it is difficult to separate out the "reformist" 
and "socialist" components of the Popular Front. One could well argue that 
the YCL's emphasis on articulating student and youth issues to the broader 
working class movement was implicitly socialist Much the same could be said 
of the inclusion within the movement of the oppressed (and hitherto largely 
silent) minority of African Canadians (surely a theme that would reward a 
graduate student searching for a path-breaking dissertation topic!). An assess-
ment of the meaning of the Popular Front in the labour movement would have 
to go over much of the ground first ploughed by Irving Abella — but with 
greater attention to rank-and-file experiences and the party-class relationship. 
We need to know more about how the party operated among its traditional 
working-class constituency, on the shop floor, and in union meetings. Even 
less is known about the socialization into "party consciousness" of a layer of 
middle-class activists. What combinations of idealism, gullibility, self-inter-
est, and political commitment comprised the individual and collective agendas 
of the middle class women and men — teachers, high school principals, 
college professors, cultural workers, social workers, youth leaders, ministers 
— who entered the party during the Popular Front? How did they relate to the 
proletarians who made up the vast majority of the pre-Popular Front member-
ship? How and to what extent did the CPC change them and they it? What part 
Bulletin #830, 28 CX:tober 1936. The unions were the railway carmen, machinists, 
men's and women's garment unions, painters, millinery workers and furriers. 
""BulUtin #812,24 June 1936. 
''^BulUlin #820,19 August 1936. 
''*BulUtin #828,14 October 1936. 
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did identification with the Soviet Union play in their socialism? And when, if 
ever, and why did the odd ritual of Stalin worship start to erode? What were 
the implications of the CPC's readiness to create special clubs for new 
membors who *Vould not fit into our units as they are now established." Was 
this concession, clearly aimed at the middle-class (among whom we might 
arguably include a layer of union officials) who could not afford to be too open 
about their politics, indicative of socialist strength or weakness? 
If our objective is to produce a Social History of Canadian Communism a 
case can be made for "bending the stick" away from the party's relationship 
with Moscow towards party life and activity at the base. Even if we accept 
that ultimately the Popular Front was a massive fraud perpetrated by the 
Comintern on "boudoir bolsheviks" who would be made to "walk the plank 
in good time," it set in motion an interactive process that was not remotely 
controllable on a day-to-day basis. Until the work has been done on these 
and other questions, this writer will content himself with stating that this series 
is an appropriate starting point 
his study of the largely African American CP in Alabama, Robyn D.G. Kelley 
states at the outset his intention to take for granted, then ignore, the CPUSA's ultimate 
subservience to the Comintern. Ignoring also the liberal anti-communist historiography 
that is fixated on that very relationship, he plunges into a brilliant exposition of 
ground-level communist practice. While admiring Kelley's boldness, 1 feel that both 
dimensions of the conununist experience require consideration. See Robyn D.G. 
Kelley, Hammer and Hoe: Alabama Communists during the Great Depression (Chapel 
HiU 1990), xiii-iv. 
nThese expressions are taken from the memoirs of Jan Valtin, Into the Night (London 
1988 [originally 1941]), 608. One of the important insights to be drawn from this 
neglected classic is the degree oîdetachment that existed between Comintern strategists 
and functionaries and national CPs. 
The paucity of published materials on the Popular Front in Canada is reflected in its 
complete absence from Bryan D. Palmer's panoptic Working Class Experience: 
Rethinking the History cf Canadian Labour, 1800-1991 (Toronto 1992). 
